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POINTS OF LAW OR PACT FOR REVIEW 
Petitioners request review of the portion of the November 18, 
1994 opinion in this matter which addresses violations of 
Article I, §24 of the Utah Constitution. On page 8 of the opinion 
the Court decided not to reach the arguments raised by petitioners 
regarding equal protection and the uniform operation of the laws 
based on the belief that such issues were not raised in the 
administrative proceedings under review. Further, in footnote 7 on 
page 8 of the opinion the Court ruled: 
. . . the portions of the hearing transcripts cited by 
petitioners fail to suggest that such concepts were in 
any way "raised to a level of consciousness such that the 
[Tax Commission could] consider it." 
Petitioners seek review for the reason that the decision of 
the Court on this issue is in error. Equal treatment under the Tax 
Commission's Rule R865-4-2D was clearly a central focus of the 
arguments below. The arguments brought to the attention of the Tax 
Commission the essential inequality of the Tax Commission's 
allowance of an exemption to certain special fuel users but not to 
these petitioners. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE HEARING TRANSCRIPT ESTABLISHES THAT UNIFORM 
TREATMENT UNDER THE LAW WAS A CENTRAL ISSUE BEFORE 
THE TAX COMMISSION. 
A primary focus of the position of these petitioners, both 
before the Tax Commission and before this Court, has been that the 
refusal to grant these petitioners an exemption for their non-
propulsion special fuel use amounts to unequal treatment compared 
with other, similar non-propulsion users of special fuel. The way 
in which this unequal treatment was highlighted to the Tax 
Commission was by reference to the Tax Commission's own Rule R865-
4-2D. In this Rule the Tax Commission grants to a concrete mixer 
truck, which is consuming special fuel while in a non-propulsion 
mode, a 20% exemption from the special fuel tax. The Rule, 
likewise, grants to garbage trucks with trash compactors, using 
special fuel in a non-propulsion mode, a 5% exemption. 
References to this Rule and the unequal classifications it 
creates are found throughout the transcript of the hearing. The 
transcript itself is forty pages in length. The initial argument 
of the petitioners covers twenty-six of those pages. References to 
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Rule R865-4-2D begin on page 11 and cover, almost exclusively, 
pages 18 through 26. 
Not surprisingly, the Tax Commission hearing officer, at page 
28 of the transcript, asked the Assistant Attorney General to 
respond to the issues raised by Rule R865-4-2D. On page 30 of the 
transcript the Assistant Attorney General attempted to argue that 
there was a "substantial difference11 between the exemptions granted 
by the rule and the exemption which these petitioners seek. Other 
attempts by the respondent to justify the inequality is found on 
page 31 of the transcript as well. 
Finally, the rebuttal argument of these petitioners covers 
pages 36 through 39 of the transcript. The entire rebuttal 
argument of the petitioners focuses on the differential treatment 
granted by Rule R865-4-2D to similar users. 
The following specific citations from the transcript are 
examples of the manner in which the issue of unequal treatment 
under the law was specifically raised and argued before the Tax 
Commission: 
1. At page 19 of the transcript, beginning on line 2, counsel 
for petitioners makes the following statement: 
And look what they do. This Commission has 
promulgated rules that say for a concrete mixer you get 
20%; garbage trucks, 5%; and theyfve just sort of all 
parked — I donft know if theyfve ballparked them 
necessarily, but they've come up with some arbitrary 
percentages• 
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Now, I ask this Court to consider what is the 
difference? What is the difference? And they don't even 
worry about where that concrete mixer is sitting when 
it's using its power takeoff to run its concrete mixer. 
They don't even worry about it. They just say# Look, 
there is a certain percentage of that fuel that's being 
used, what? While the vehicle is not being propelled 
down the roadways of this state. So, what are we going 
to do? We are not going to tax it. 
What is the difference, I ask you, between a 
diesel concrete mixer sitting there on or off the road 
and using its power takeoff and the engine running and a 
tractor trailer on or off the road — and I submit to 
your Honor they're off the road — but never the less, 
what is the difference between that and one sitting there 
running its air conditioner and its system? What is the 
difference? There is none. (Emphasis added.) 
2. At page 36 of the transcript, beginning at line 6, counsel 
for petitioners makes the following argument: 
I mean, we just — all I'm pointing this out for 
is that they can't have it both ways. They can't say, 
Well, operation means operation. All right, then if 
operation means operation, then concrete trucks gotta 
[sic] be taxed on all of their fuel because they're on. 
The ignition is on, the engine is running; I don't care 
if its moving or not, its operating. Because a concrete 
truck isn't operating a separate piece of equipment, its 
operating itself just in the same way that — you know, 
it's operating its air conditioner while it's running the 
mixture in back. It's operating itself. A garbage truck 
is operating itself, okay? 
So, if that is it, then the Commission is 
obviously inconsistent, and I submit it isn't • • • • 
The Commission is saying, Look, we recognize certain 
circumstances where in some notion or another we're not 
on the highways, traveling down the roads and doing all 
of those things for which the fuel was intended to be 
taxed, we're doing something else. 
And, yes, in the next five seconds that concrete 
truck may drive up on the street and drive away and then 
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that fuel is going to be taxed. In the same way that in 
the next five seconds an over-the-road tractor trailer 
drives up on the street and drives down the road and 
takes off and that fuel's going to be taxed. But for the 
government to say, Well, operation means something 
different for us than it does for the rest of the 
vehicles on the road is improper, is highly 
discriminatory and doesn't fly in the face of the 
legislative intent. (Emphasis added.) 
3. At page 38, beginning on line 5, the following point is 
made: 
And all of the legislative and all of the rule-making 
scheme is designed to differentiate between those uses. 
I mean, that's what's there. It's all designed to do 
that and all we're simply saying is that here's another 
use that is designed to differentiate between and they 
simply haven't done it. (Emphasis added.) 
4. Lastly, beginning at line 24 on page 38 of the transcript, 
the petitioners argue: 
And so they've carved out exceptions because they 
understand what the statute is for. This one is no 
different than those exceptions and we'd asked that it be 
adopted on that basis. 
If any message was delivered to the Tax Commission by these 
petitioners it was that they are entitled to the same treatment as 
other similar users of special fuel. The argument before the Tax 
Commission was that if you were going to grant exemptions for 
certain operations of certain vehicles, you must grant exemptions 
to other similar vehicles with similar operations. 
As was pointed out to the Tax Commission, it simply does not 
make sense to allow an exemption for certain non-propulsion uses of 
fuel, such as the operation of a cement mixer on a diesel truck 
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while at the same time, on a wholesale basis, disallow the non-
propulsion fuel used by an over-the-road diesel tractor. 
Reasonable minds may differ as to the decision of the Tax 
Commission, but there cannot be any dispute that the issue of 
unequal treatment was raised and addressed to the Tax Commission. 
POINT II: THE RESPONDENT FAILED TO OBJECT TO THE RAISING OF 
THIS ISSUE BEFORE THE TAX COMMISSION. 
It is interesting to note that the respondent never once 
objected to the raising of this issue before the Tax Commission. 
The memoranda of the parties, filed in connection with the Motion 
for Summary Judgment did not mention Rule R865-4-2D. Nevertheless, 
at the hearing, as has been shown above, Rule R865-4-2D became a 
central focus. Yet, despite repeated opportunities to do so, the 
respondent did not object to arguments relating to the rule. 
Respondent did not claim some sort of surprise or inadequate 
preparation. Indeed, as has been shown above, the respondent 
attempted to argue that there was substantial differences between 
the granting an exemption for a cement mixer and the failure to 
grant an exemption for these petitioners. (Tr. 30-31) 
It is further interesting to note that the respondent made no 
effort to argue this issue to this Court at the time of hearing. 
Admittedly, the respondent raised, in its brief, the alleged 
failure of petitioners to argue equal protection before the Tax 
Commission. Yet, Respondent gave no time to that argument during 
the hearing process. 
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While these two failures do not necessarily constitute a 
waiver by the respondent, they are instructive as to the state of 
knowledge and awareness of these parties and the Tax Commission. 
No one was misled or unsure as to the positions of the parties 
before the Tax Commission. Everyone understood that petitioners 
were attacking the unequal treatment they receive under the law. 
Petitioners argued that under the rules of the Tax Commission 
itself there was authority to grant them similar treatment. The 
ruling of the Tax Commission was to grant unequal treatment. 
POINT III: REMAND FOR A DETERMINATION OF THIS ISSUE IS 
APPROPRIATE. 
If one thing is clear, it is that the question of equal 
protection and uniform operation of laws, and whether such was 
raised, is disputed. Perhaps the best forum for resolution of the 
dispute is the Tax Commission. The hearing officer knows whether 
or not equal protection was an element of the argument made. 
Before this Court rules on that issue, inquiries should be made to 
the Tax Commission. 
At the very least, this matter should be remanded with 
instructions to the Tax Commission to consider and rule upon the 
issue of whether or not these petitioners have been treated 
unfairly and unequally under Rule R865-4-2D. If the Tax Commission 
feels that it requires more information on that issue it could ask 
for the same from the parties. In this way, this Court could be 
assured that the lower tribunal had been given full opportunity to 
7 
consider this issue. Each party would then have its right to 
review of that decision by this Court. 
CONcmsyop 
It is respectfully submitted that this Court has erred in 
refusing to rule on the issue of equal protection and uniform 
operation of the laws. These issues were hotly contested before 
the Tax Commission. At the very least, if the Tax Commission has 
failed to rule, a remand should be granted so that the issue can be 
more squarely addressed. Petitioner's Request for Rehearing should 
be granted. 
DATED this 2nd day of December, 1994 
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
W W -
CRAIG G. ADAMSON 
ERIC P. LEE 
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